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VICTORIA UNIVERSliV or WELLINGTON 
I INTRODUCTION 
The right to strike is guaranteed by international law and bestowed upon all 
employees.' From the mid 20th century, it has been used as a legitimate method of 
defending the social and economic interests of workers and only in exceptional 
circumstances will the right to strike be removed. Yet political and moral debate seizes 
New Zealand over the ability of health sector workers to engage in industrial action. A 
war of words has developed when doctors down their scalpels and stethoscopes and 
when nurses, radiographers and food and cleaning services exercise this right. What 
should be a process of negotiation between two parties over the renewal or creation of a 
collective agreement is complicated as patients and their families are drawn into the 
debate. The severe impact of strikes on a vulnerable section of society, the sick and the 
weak, has led to public outcry and a call for legislative change. 
This paper examines the debate as to whether the right to strike in the health 
sector should be maintained. Consideration is given to the main arguments put forward 
on each side of the debate, to the validity of the debate in light of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 (ERA) and to possible legislative alternatives. An international 
comparison is used to demonstrate New Zealand's position internationally and to 
determine whether the correct balance has been struck between guaranteeing a 
fundamental human right and ensuring the health and safety of a nation. 
II THE DEBATE: A RIGHT TO STRIKE OR NOT? 
A Introduction 
Since the ERA replaced the Employment Contracts Act 1990 (ECA), the rate of 
stoppages has dropped by nearly 20 percent. However, the problem nowadays is not so 
much the number of strikes but more who is striking. A relative shift in union density 
to 68 per cent in the public sector has meant that strikes, which were once the domain of 
1 The right to strike is not set out explicitly in ILO Conventions and Recommendations. "The right to 
strike is, however, mentioned incidentally in a Convention and in a Recommendation. The Abolition of 
Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No 105), prohibits the use of forced or compulsory labour "as a 
puni hment for having participated in strikes" (Article 1, subparagraph (d); and the Voluntary 
Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation , 1951 (No 92), first mentions strikes in paragraphs 4 and 6, 
then states in paragraph 7 that no provision it contains "may be interpreted as limiting, in any way 
whatsoever, the right to strike" (ILO, 1996b, p 89 and 1996a, p 660)." Bernard Gemigon, Alberto Odero 
and Horacio Guido JLO Principles Concerning The Right To Strike (lntemational Labour Organization, 
Switzerland, 1998) 7, n I. The right to strike is also preserved in the lntemational Covenant on Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights, art 8( I )(d). 
private sector workers in large scale factory and transport employment, have now 
moved to become prevalent in both the education and health sector. As a consequence 
there has arisen a perennial debate as to whether health sector employees should be able 
to strike. Industrial Action in this sector is always met with a great deal of controversy 
and comment not only by the public and District Health Boards (DBHs) but from within 
the medical profession itself Conflicting opinions have been voiced, some arguing that 
medical strikes are unethical while other advocate that the need for improvement in 
conditions justifies such action.
2 
B A Ban 011 Strikes in the Health Sector? Is a Law Change the Solution? 
Calls for the Government to intervene in the strike-ridden health sector are 
commonplace. Christchurch-based Health Cuts Hurt wants to see fully funded 
arbitration, like that used to settled a secondary school teachers' dispute in 2002, replace 
the current law. 3 Such groups make strong arguments.
4 Since June 2006, hospitals 
have been hit by strikes by junior doctors, nurses, orderlies and food and service 
cleaners. Consequently, an estimated 1800 planned operations in Canterbury have been 
disrupted. Health Cuts Hurt spokeswoman Eleanor Carter said patients face an 
"appalling" situation. 5 Waiting lists in some parts of the North Island have stretched to 
18 weeks which in some cases has forced health boards to fly patients to Australia for 
treatment.6 
The chairman of the Medical Council, Professor John Campbell, has also called 
for a ban on strikes in the health sector. 7 He argues that industrial action is totally 
unsatisfactory and other methods need to be considered. Pay issues can be resolved 
through arbitration and that strikes are a markedly dangerous and ineffective alternative. 
Each time industrial action is taken there is an increase in uncertainty of diagnoses, 
management and of risk. Professor Campbell noted that while it is unclear that the 
cumulative effect of health sector strikes and decisions made by clinicians during the 
2 Frank Frizelle "Is it Ethical for Doctors to Strike?" (2006) 119( I 236) New Zealand Medical Journal. 
3 It is important to note that arbitration used in the teachers' strikes was voluntary arbitration. Health Cuts 
hurts wants compulsory arbitration imposed of a similar structure to that used during the teachers strike. 
4 
Kamala Ilayman "Government Action Called For" (18 January 2007) The Press Christchurch 4. 
5 Ibid. 
6 
Kamala Hayman "Longer Wait Blamed on Unions" (16 January 2007) The Press Christchurch 2. 
7 NZPA "Ban on Strike by Health Workers Only Way Forward" (29 November 2006) NZPA Wellington. 
2 
strikes had led to any deaths, this possibility cannot be ruled out. 8 Canterbury DHB 
voted for a ban on strikes this year. The Medical Council and the Orthopaedic 
Association have both suggested that health workers be subject to compulsory 
arbitration. 9 Various reasons have been cited to justify such a law change. 
1 Delayed treatment 
The exclusion from treatment of many patients under patient safety provisions 
naturally bears the consequence of delays in the delivery of essential treatment and 
therapy. For example, many cancer patients are deprived of appropriate, timely access 
to radiotherapy treatment. During radiographer strikes in November 2006, any patient 
with cancer in Category A or B, that are the more serious forms of cancer, received 
his/her treatment within a "good practice framework". However, in Auckland and 
Wellington some category C patients, with "less serious" forms of cancer, had their 
treatment delayed to an extent that some had to be offered treatment in Australia. 10 
Category C patents can wait up to 18 weeks to start treatment ; the recommended time is 
between four to six weeks. Jill Lane, the Hutt Valley DHB spokesperson noted that 
contingency planning and the effects of industrial action has resulted in the "need to 
treat those people that have the highest clinical need and at this particular moment 
women with breast cancer" and other less serious forms of cancer "don't meet that 
need." 11 Delays in treatment caused by strikes increase stress in both patients and their 
families . It is unclear whether delays in medical treatment have caused any worsening 
of patients ' medical conditions and no deaths have occurred due to industrial action. 
However delays have prompted comment that during strikes, New Zealand's health care 
system is "a third world health system." 12 
2 Economic cost of strikes 
Industrial action appears to have caused lasting damage from which health 
systems struggle to recover, has been very costly in both the short and long term and has 
not accomplished what the management or unions have sought to achieve. In 2006 the 
number of days lost by hospital strikes ballooned to 11500 compared to just 1700 in 
8 Ibid . 
9 Hayman, "Government Action Called For", above n 4. 
10 Hon Pete Hodgson (14 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6409. 
11 "Cancer Patients Get More Bad News" (8 June 2006) One Nell's Auckland www.tvnz.co.nz (accessed 
20 August 2007). 
12 Ibid , quoted from Breast Cancer Foundation spokesperson Dr Belinda Scott. 
3 
2000. 13 Increasing dependence on locums has been seen throughout the western world, 
particularly in the context of industrial action. Although standard form employment 
contracts set a minimum locum rate of $45 an hour for house officers and $60 an hour 
for registrars, actual pay ranges between $ 70 and $120 an hour. It is estimated that 
lo cum doctors have taken $10 million of the Canterbury's health budget this year and 
nationally it is predicted the cost will be over $100 million. 
14 
This differential 
demonstrates a marked difference between employer's hopes and the true market rates 
of employing replacement workers. 
3 The blame game 
Political comment is expected and National has led the attack on the ERA 
legislative scheme. In 2006 National's Industrial Relations spokesman, Wayne Mapp, 
accused the Ministers of Labour and Health of "simply sitting on their hands while the 
health sector is increasingly paralysed by strikes."
15 The ERA amendments in 2004 
have been blamed for having a multimillion-dollar impact on the economy. It is ironic, 
however, that under the ERA, strikes in the health sector have decreased, suggesting 
comparatively less cost compared to under the ECA. 
The Government itself has put pressure on the unions by attributing blame. 
Helen Clark, speaking on National Radio on 4 December 2006 commented that all 
strikes undertaken by junior doctors, radiation technologists, radiographers and medical 
laboratory workers had been organised by the same person, Dr Deborah Powell, and 
noted that other unions within the sector were more willing to negotiate.
16 Opposition 
comment is common, accusing union leaders and members of union of having no 
concern for the impact of such industrial action on families in need of medical care. 
17 
4 General public comment 
The public has also voiced their frustration and attributed blame. In light of a 
radiographers' strike in January this year, the Anglican Church commented that it is 
13 "Health Sector Disruptions Escalate" (26 April 2007) Newsta/k ZB Auckland www.tvnz.co.nz 
(accessed 20 August 2007). 
14 Kamala Hayman "Relief Doctors Costing Millions" (14 June 2007) The Press Christchurch 
www.stuff.co.nz (accessed 20 August 2007). 
15 Wayne Mapp, New Zealand National Party "Time for Minister to Act on Health Strikes" (15 November 
2006) Press Release. 
16 It is important to note that Mrs Powell was also involved in many influential strikes under the ECA. 
17 Mapp, above n 15. 
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time striking radiation therapists stopped endangering lives. The Dean of Holy Trinity 
Cathedral in Auckland, Bishop Richard Randerson, says families will not be forgiving if 
loved ones die because of the strikes and that the health system is failing people if it 
allows strike action over a pay claim to impact on peoples' lives. 18 It is the delicacy of 
and public interest in the health sector that leads to blame being directed at individuals 
involved or parties to the dispute. However, simply because the public shows animosity 
towards strikes and blames those striking workers does not mean that the right to strike 
should be legislatively removed. 
5 Are patients being used as pawns? Do strikes impact on those they are intended 
to? 
While strikes aim to cripple the employer, those who are most affected are the 
patients themselves. DHBs and the public alike both claim that unions are willing to 
sacrifice patients to achieve unions' aims. The transfer of patients due to industrial 
action has been shown to result in relocation anxiety, a well-recognised phenomenon 
where patients are taken out of an environment where they are comfortable and have 
trust in the staff and have to build up trust anew. 19 The delays caused by strikes also 
cause distress in the families of patients. In a study that measured the effects of strikes 
on the families of intensive care patients, it was shown that industrial action caused 
measurable distress and anxiety to the relatives involved. 20 In light of this study it was 
concluded that industrial conflict must be resolved through negotiation if at all possible. 
At every level, health sector employees have a responsibility to avoid strike action. 21 
However, it must be noted that strike action is considered a measure of last resort by 
unions and is only employed after all other possible means to conclude an agreement 
have been fully explored and utilised. Negative consequences in relation to third parties 
are simply unavoidable when the right to strike is exercised in any industry. 
18 "Church Wants to End Radiation Row,, (10 January 2007) Newstalk ZB Auckland www.tvnz.co.nz 
(accessed 21 August 2007). 
19 P Johnson "Rural Peoples' Experience of Critical Illness Involving inter-hospital Transportation: a 
Qualitative Study" (1999) 12(1) Australian Critical Care 12-16. 
20 Peter Dzendrowskyj , Geoff Shaw and Lucy Johnston "Effects of Nursing Industrial Action on relatives 
oflntensive Care Patients: A 16-month Follow-up" (2004) 117(1205) New Zealand Medical Journal. 
2 1 Ibid, 12. 
5 
6 Other reasons to ban strikes in the health sector 
Reasons given by those against strikes in the health sector were published in 1986 and 
are still restated by many today. These include:
22 
a. Strikes could result in unavoidable suffering and death; 
b. It would be a breach of the fiduciary duty doctors have towards their patients; 
c. It would be against the Code of Ethics many health sector workers have sworn 
to; 
d. It would amount to "holding to ransom" a weak and vulnerable segment of the 
population for material gain; 
e. It would shatter the image of doctors as selfless healers; and 
f Doctors are already overpaid and strike action is greed. 
C Why Strikes in the Health Sector Should Remain Legal 
Opposition to strikes in the health sector is met with forceful argument for the 
right to be maintained. It is argued that the whole point of industrial action is that it 
creates a very difficult situation for an employer who is unwilling to reach a satisfactory 
settlement during the course of normal collective bargaining. Its purpose is to bring an 
unwilling employer back to the table and to a settlement. There are already statutory 
restrictions on the right to strike, both general and specific to the health sector. Further 
legal restriction of the right to strike would not only decrease the bargaining power of 
unions but would also breach international principles of labour law. 
1 International principles 
From its second meeting in 1952, the Committee on Freedom of Association, a 
subset of the International Labour Office (ILO), has declared strike action to be a right 
bestowed upon all employees. 23 The right to strike is a human right guaranteed by 
international law and is generally reflected in the laws of democratic countries. This 
right is exercised by health professionals in accordance with ethical standards of their 
professional and international organisations. Although used only when absolutely 
22 PS Sachdev "Doctors ' Strike - an Ethical Justification" 99 (1986) New Zealand Medical Journal 412-4. 
23 Gemigon, Odero and Horacio, above n I, I I . 
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necessary, the right to take effective strike action is viewed as fundamental by many 
health sector organisations and their members world-wide.24 
2 Balancing out bargaining power 
It is vital that unions are able to act to ensure that the salaries and conditions of 
health sector employees are good enough to attract people into this essential service. In 
order to do so, freedom of association must be guaranteed and the right to strike must be 
legislatively available. Employers naturally have greater bargaining power and if 
collective bargaining reaches an impasse, there must be a means available of breaking 
the deadlock. If medical professionals are unable to strike, this significantly decreases 
their bargaining power and therefore preventing the obtainment of more favourable 
employment conditions. If industrial action is legislatively prevented, this would 
destroy a system where workers' collective right to exert economic pressure creates a 
balance of bargaining power between employers and employees. 25 
3 Public notice prior to and during industrial action 
The ERA envisages a publicity campaign so that the issues raised by industrial 
action are sufficiently understood by the public, thus ensuring a wide range of support. 
Awareness of resource issues minimises some of the concerns the public may have 
when industrial action does occur. Suggestions are generally given to the public to seek 
alternative health care at a facility unaffected by the strike combined with the 
establishment of a plan to provide essential services during the period of industrial 
action. During a strike the principles upheld by health sector employees include: 26 
1. Ensuring minimum level of disruption to the general public; 
2. The delivery of essential health services to a reduced patient population; 
3. Crisis intervention by heath professional for the preservation of life; 
4. Ongoing health care to assure the survival of those unable to care for 
themselves; 
5. Therapeutic services without which life would be jeopardised; and 
24 New Zealand Nurses Organisation "Submission to the Transport and industrial Relations Select 
Committee on the Employment Relations Amendment Bill 2004". 
25 Chris White "Workchoices: Removing the Choice to Strike" (2005) 56 Journal of Australian Political 
Economy 66, 76. 
26 International Cow1cil ofNurses Guidelines on Essential Se,vices During labour Conflict (International 
Council ofNurses, Geneva, 2004) 5. 
7 
6. Health services necessary for urgent diagnostic procedures required to 
obtain information on potentially life-threatening conditions. 
D Conclusion 
Wage increases generally require government funding and often governments 
will use public sector pay restraint as a political tool to keep budgets under control. 
Therefore, government strategy plays a major role in determining whether union 
demands will be met. It is of paramount importance that, if possible such political 
policy can be challenged. Both sides of the debate put forward credible and convincing 
arguments. In light of this, the right to strike needs to be balanced with the paramount 
concern of patient safety, preservation of life and prevention of permanent disability. At 
the forefront must be patient safety in the event of a strike while at the same time 
ensuring the principle of the right to strike is not undermined. 
III THE CUKRENT LEGISLATION 
A Introduction 
In 1991 the ECA introduced a policy that promoted individual contracts. Strikes 
remained legal but the ability for ministerial interference was reduced and provisions 
concerning compulsory intervention were removed. This was in stark contrast to New 
Zealand's first statutory framework that promoted a desire to avoid the destructive 
consequences of industrial conflict by providing a process that required employers and 
trade unions to resolves their difference through the institutional framework of 
conciliation and arbitration. 27 While the ERA emphasised collective bargaining as the 
norm for collective settlements and provided stronger recognition of unions, it 
maintains comparatively minimal intervention with regards to strikes. 
B Lawful Strikes 
Under section 83 of the ERA, for a strike to be lawful it must not be classified as 
unlawful under section 86.28 The strike must relate to bargaining for either a collective 
27 Hon Margaret Wilson "The Employment Relations Act: A framework for a fairer way'' in Erling 
Rasmussen (ed) Employment Relationships: Ne\V Zealand's Employment Relations Act (Auckland 
University Press, Auckland, 2004) I 0. 
28 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 86(l)(a)-(g) sets out when a strike will be unlawful; note that s 83 
also applies to lockouts. 
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agreement that will bind each of the employees concerned, 29 or relate to bargaining with 
regard to an aspect of a collective agreement in respect of which the right to strike is 
available under a declaration made by the court under section 192( c ). 30 Participation in a 
strike will also be lawful if the employees who strike have reasonable grounds for 
believing that the strike is justified on the grounds of safety or health. 31 
C Essential Services 
Under the ERA the obligation to give notice depends partially on whether the 
proposed strike or lockout is being undertaken by employees employed in, or an 
employer engaged in, an essential service. As defined by the ILO, an "essential service" 
is one in which ''the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or 
health of the whole or part of the population."32 The New Zealand legislative scheme 
conforms to this and is based, at last in part, on the apparent assumption that any strike 
or lockout in an essential service will cause disruption of a kind which is contrary to the 
public interest. As the public health sector falls within Schedule 1 (11) of the ERA, 
industrial is first governed by the essential services provisions in sections 90-92 of the 
Act. The obligation to give notice of a strike or lockout applies only if the proposed 
strike or lockout ''will affect the public interest, including (without limitation) public 
health or safety. "33 
1 Public interest requirement 
The ERA inserts the criterion of "public interest" as a prerequisite to the 
application of the special notice provisions. This criterion did not previously exist 
under the ECA where the essential service provisions were applicable provided that the 
striking union fell with in Schedule 3 of the Act. Under the ERA a strike or lockout will 
be in the public interest: 34 
Where the matter directly or indirectly affects a significant number of people 
or where a matter will have significant effects. Whether a matter is in the 
29 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 83(b)(l). 
30 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 83(b)(ii). 
3 1 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 84. 
32 Gemigon, Odero and Horacio, above n I, 20. 
33 Employment Relations Act 2000, ss 90(2) and 91 (2) . 
34 Department of Labour "Report to the Employment and Accident Insurance Legislation Committee on 
the Employment Relations Bill 2000" (June 2004) 104. 
9 
public interest has to be considered on a case by case basis depending on the 
circumstances of the matter. 
In the case of the public health sector, it is unlikely that a strike will not fall under 
public interest. Ensuring seamless service delivery in this sector is clearly a matter 
constantly in the public eye and is of the utmost importance to patients and their 
families. 
2 Notice requirement 
Under section 90(2) if the proposed strike will affect the public interest, 
including public safety or health,35 and if it relates to bargaining under section 83(b),
36 
the requirements under section 90(1)(b) of the Act must be complied with. No employee 
in an essential service may strike without giving notice to their employer and the chief 
executive of their intention to strike within 28 days before the date of comrnencement.
37 
The courts have noted that the ERA notice provisions must be strictly adhered to.
38 
Furthermore, under section 90( 1) no employee may strike unless the strike is lawful 
under sections 83 or 84. 
Under section 90(3) the notice required by section 90(1)(b)(i) must be no less 
than 14 days in advance in the case of a strike within the public health sector. The 
notice must also specify the nature of the proposed strike, the place or places where it 
will occur and the date on which the strike will begin. Upon receipt of such notice, the 
chief executive is obliged by section 92 to "ensure that mediation services are provided 
as soon as possible to the parties to the proposed strike or lockout for the purpose of 
assisting the parties to avoid industrial action." 
35 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 90(2)(a). 
36 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 90(2)(b) . 
37 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 90(J)(b)(i). 
38 The Labour Court once pointed out that the provisions of what is now s 90 are mandatory and that 
Parliament intended the section to be applied strictly (Air NZ Ltd v NZ Air Line Pilots Assn [ 1987] NZILR 
742). 
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3 Mediation 
Section 92 places an obligation on the chief executive to provide mediation 
services, rather than obliging the parties to attempt mediation within the notice period. 39 
This service is provided by the Department of Labour through their mediation service. 
No coercive powers are given to the chief executive if parties themselves are unwilling 
to mediate, however, the duty of good faith under section 4 requires the parties to adopt 
a co-operative approach to a mediated settlement of the issues giving rise to the 
proposed industrial action. 40 
D Schedule JB Code of Good Faith 
Strikes or lockouts inevitably raise concerns for patients' safety and well-being. 
To help alleviate such concerns, section 1 OOD provides for and regulates a Code of 
Good Faith for the Public Health Sector (the Code).41 The Code was a joint venture 
between the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions and District Health Boards New 
Zealand and was agreed to supplement existing mechanisms under the ERA. It was 
enacted in 2004 and is contained in schedule 1 B of the Act. Its provisions sit along side 
the essential service provisions and both are applied when issues arise concerning 
industrial action in the public health sector. Under section 1 OOD the Code does not limit 
the application of the duty of good faith contained in section 4. Accordingly, it is a 
breach of good faith for a person to whom the Code applies to fail to comply with it
42 
and unlike other codes developed under Part 8A which serve only as a guide for the 
specified institutions, the Code is directly enforceable. 
1 Purpose 
The Code was agreed as a response to the high level of public criticism 
invariably attached to industrial action in the health sector. The aim was to provide a 
legislative method in order to minimise the disruptive effects of industrial action while 
ensuring adequate employment protection was available to employees.
43 It was built on 
the principle that the public is better served when responsibility and power are shared 
39 Ann-Marie Hendra and Kit Toogood QC "Strikes and Lockouts" in New Zealand Law Society 
Employment Law Co,iference (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) 55 , 61. 
40 Ibid. 
41 The Code was added bys 36 of the Employment Relations Amendment Act (No 2) 2004. 
42 Employment Relations Act 2000, s IOOD(4) . 
43 Anna Fitzgibbon " Individual Employment Agreements, Code of Good Faith for Public Health Section 
Institutions" in New Zealand Law Society Employment Law Co,?ference (New Zealand Law Society, 
Wellington , 2004) 23, 26. 
II 
between government, DHBs and health unions, than when they are wielded against one 
and other. The Code was developed in the context of a move towards a tripartism 
which is reflected in three main objectives:
44 
1. To promote productive employment relationships in the public health sector; 
2. To require the parties to make or continue a commitment to develop to 
maintain and provide high quality public health services, to ensure the 
safety of patients and to re-engage constructively and to ensure participate 
fully and effectively in all aspects of their employment relationships; and 
3. To recognise the importance of collective arrangements and the role of 
unions in the public health sector.
45 
2 Coverage 
The Code is widely applicable and under schedule 1 B(l) it applies to DHBs, 
employees of DHBs, unions whose members are employed by DHBs and any other 
employers to the extent that they provide services to DHBs or the New Zealand Blood 
Service. 
3 Patient safety provisions 
It was considered that a code of employment practice was a more effective way 
to balance the needs of health sector employees with public health and safety during 
industrial action as it allowed for a consensus approach to managing staffing levels 
during strikes. The Code contains an obligation for employers to provide for patient 
safety during industrial action by ensuring that life preserving services (LPS) are 
available to prevent serious threat to life or permanent disability. Crisis intervention 
regarding therapeutic services, without which life would be jeopardised, and urgent 
diagnostic procedures that are required to obtain information on potentially life 
threatening conditions, must also be provided for. The Code sets out specific 
requirements to ensure patient safety under sections 11-13 of Schedule 1 B. As enacted, 
it recognises that it is the employer who is responsible for patient safety during a strike. 
The purpose of giving 14 days notice of industrial action under section 90(3) is to 
ensure that the employer understands the nature of the notified action, has time to 
consider what risks it poses and to prepare appropriate contingency plans. 
44 Employment Relations Act 2000, Schedule I B(3). 
45 Employment Relations Act 2000, Schedule 1B(2). 
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Under the Code employers are obliged to develop contingency plans and there 
are mechanisms to require union members to stay at work to assist in maintaining LPS. 
A failure by the employer to make adequate provisions for safety does not shift the 
responsibility to the union or to the medical professionals engaged in industrial action.
46 
If an employer believes that it cannot arrange to deliver LPS without the assistance of 
members of the union, a request may be made to the union seeking assistance. 47 The 
request must include: 48 
a. Specific details concerning the LPS the employer seeks assistance to 
maintain; 
b. The employer's contingency plan; and 
c. What support is required from union members. 
The obligation of good faith requires that the parties must meet and make every 
effort to agree on:49 
a. The extent of the LPS necessary to provide for patient safety; 
b. The number of staff necessary to enable the employer to provide that LPS; 
and 
c. A protocol for the management of emergencies which require additional 
LPS. 
In order to fulfil its obligation under the Code, the employer's plan must minimise the 
demand for LPS and must also minimise or ideally eliminate any reliance on health 
sector workers who are covered by the strike notice. so 
4 The Main objections to the code 
Under the ECA (prior to the Code being inserted into the ERA), the requirement 
to provide life saving services was not statutorily enforceable. This posed a serious 
risk to patient safety. Commenting on a national resident doctors' strike scheduled to 
46 Geoff Annals "Health Sector Code of Good Faith developed: a Health Sector Code of Good Faith, 
designed to assist relationships between workers and employers, has been developed over the last two 
years. It sets out rights and responsibilities, most notably when health workers take industrial action" 
(October 2004) l 0(9) Kai Tiaki Nursing New Zealand 29. 
47 Schedule 1 B 12(2) 
48 Schedule l 8(3) 
49 Schedule l 8(5) 
50 Annals, above n 46, 29. 
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take place in November 2004, Ian Powell, Executive Director of the Association of 
Salaried Medical Specialists said: 
51 
There is no way that safe emergency care can be provided for such a long 
period of time ... This planned strike is something that a public health system 
has not experienced before and is not resourced to handle without seriously 
compromising patient safety. 
The major risk to patients in the event of a strike arises from a failure to properly assess 
risk or failure to plan to manage those risks. Often, these failures occur because 
employers and unions have not been clear who is responsible for safety during a 
strike. 52 Any risk to patients also poses serious risk to the effectiveness of industrial 
action. The fear of harm to patients is one of the most significant factors that stop 
health professionals from taking strike action. It is in the interests of both patents and 
effective industrial action that the critical issue of patient safety is managed via the 
Code. 
While the Code provides significant extra protection for umons and their 
members, it is questionable how much protection it affords to patients and out-patients 
of hospitals and health services. The minimum number of personnel needed to 
guarantee services is perhaps one of the most difficult issues in health sector 
bargaining. 53 Often DHBs may try to broaden the definition of "essential medical 
services" while the negotiating union may try to minimise the number of employees 
required to work during the strike. It is also possible that the need to secure agreement 
over the processes to manage industrial action will be used by some employers as a 
means of preventing otherwise legitimate strike action from occurring. This would, 
however, be an employment relationship problem and as such attract the use of 
mediation. 54 
51 Association of Salaried Medical Specialists "Six Day National Resident Doctors Strike a Catastrophe" 
(18 October 2004) Press Release. 
52 Annals, above n 46, 29. 
53 International Council ofNurses, above n 26, 9. 
54 Briefing Paper from the Department of Labour to the Minister of Labour "Review of Employment 
Relations Act - Refinement of Proposals for Legislative Fine Tuning (April 2003) (Obtained under 
Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Department of Labour). 
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In light of a seven day medical laboratory workers' strike which helped to 
expose this legislative flaw, Health Minister Peter Hodgson has acknowledged that 
Government shares the concern that patients ' lives and health have been put at risk by 
strikes within the health sector. Patient safety provisions under schedule 1 B were 
amended to include provision of LPS to prevent serious threat to life or "permanent 
disability". While such explicit clarification in the proposed amended schedule to the 
ERA would "go a long way to better protect the right to strike in the health sector" and 
"help to allay some of the understandable but misplaced criticism of the health sector 
strikes", it does not completely eliminate the vagueness in this grey area. 
55 
The issue remains and has now been extended to , how far does "serious threat to 
life" and "permanent disability" extend? Although many illnesses manifest themselves 
in forms including severe pain, if a patient is not seriously at risk of permanent 
disability or death they may be turned away due to lack of resources during a strike. 
Past strikes indicate that it does not extend to the provision of all long term or ongoing 
treatment such as radiotherapy or chemotherapy. Thus, many cancer patients have the 
commencement or continuation of their treatment put on hold if considered to be less 
serious form of cancer. It is disruption to and the lack of coverage under patient safety 
prov1s1ons in relation to cancer patients that has caused much public and political 
outcry. 
It may be argued that the real threat to patient safety over the past decade has 
been under-funding. This has resulted, for example, in the crisis situation in 
Christchurch Hospital in the mid-1990s and downward pressure on salaries which has 
caused the serious staff shortages that only union bargaining settlements in the past 
couple of years has started to address. Yet the finger tends to be pointed at the striking 
health workers when they resort to industrial action. In fact this is the only option the 
law provides when a settlement cannot be reached with their employers. Calls for a ban 
on strike action unfairly imply that the breakdown of negotiations is always the fault of 
health workers rather than the employer. 56 Moreover, it is ironic that on one occasion 
during negotiations under Schedule 1 B, when staffing levels could not be agreed on 
55 Association of Salaried Medical Specialists "Patient Safety Change Applauded" (18 December 2006) 
Press Release. 
56 Ross Wilson (19 February 2007) The Dominion Post Wellington www.union.org.nz (accessed 20 
August 2007). 
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during a mental health workers strike, an independent adjudicator appointed more night 
staff than the DHB employer had agreed to as normal staffing. 
57 Not only does this 
indicate that staffing levels generally are a risk to patient safety but also suggests that 
there is a serious issue employment issue justifying industrial action. 
E General Rules Relating to Replacement Labour 
Section 97 sits alongside the Code and provides for the employment of 
replacement workers during strikes in ce1iain situations. The Labour Relations Act 
1987 and the ECA both pennitted the employment of replacement workers in all 
circumstances. Conversely, the ERA limits the employer's ability to employ 
replacement workers, which in tum increases the bargaining power of the striking 
union. An employer may only employ another person to perform the work of striking 
employees if the person is already employed by the employer at the time the strike 
commences, is not principally employed for the purpose of performing the work of 
striking employee(s) and if they agree to perform the work.
58 An employer may also 
engage another person to perform work if there are reasonable grounds for believing it 
is necessary for the work to be performed for reasons of health or safety. 
59 
F Conclusion 
The key concern of the legislative scheme covering strikes in the health sector is 
the degree to which the provisions are able to limit such action and/or allow for their 
management in a way that prevents endangerment to life or limb. 
60 Effective industrial 
action is legislatively compatible with being a health professional so long as essential 
services are provided. 
61 Total abandonment of ill patients is inconsistent with the 
purpose and philosophy of health professionals as reflected in almost all medical codes 
of ethics. Thus, the right to strike needs to be balanced with the vital concern of 
patient safety; that is the preservation of life and prevention of permanent disability. I 
The right to strike is not unlimited. Industrial action is not permitted for the first 
40 days after bargaining is initiated and strike action in the health sector requires that 
57 Ibid. 
58 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 97(2)(a)-(c) . 
59 Employment Relations Act 2000, s 97(4)(a). 
60 Department of Labour "Review of Employment Relations Act", above n 54. 
6 1 International Council of Nurses, above n 26, 5. 
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notice be given to the employer and to the Department of Labour, who must then 
provide mediation in an attempt to avoid the industrial action. In light of this, strikes 
are truly a last resort. The above restrictions and requirements help to maintain a 
balance in a modem health system within a modem employment relations regime. 
62 
Moreover, National- and Labour-led governments have, for more than 15 years, 
provided the right to strike as the final means of resolving bargaining. Striking under 
the ECA was legal. The key difference now is that unions and employers must agree as 
to how LPS will be provided. The ERA establishes a strong protective legislative base 
with regard to strikes in the health sector. However, while the current legislation has 
been effective, has greatly advanced previous law and provided significant limitations 
on the right to strike in the health sector, calls for legislative change continue. 
IV LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES: IS THERE A VIABLE SOLUTION? 
A Introduction 
The significant impact of industrial action and the increasing public animosity 
towards striking health sector workers has led to comment and debate, both political and 
moral, as to the appropriate governing legislative scheme. The question must be asked 
whether the ERA achieves an appropriate balance between the rights of workers, 
employers and affected third parties or whether New Zealand requires a legislative 
change. 
B Compulsory Arbitration 
Whether the health sector should be viewed as any other emergency service and 
therefore subject to alternative routes of resolving disputes such as compulsory 
arbitration is topical in light of the recent health sector strikes. A possible solution may 
focus on the health sector being deemed an essential service, like the police, for whom 
strike action is illegal under the Police Act 1958.
63 Under the Police Act final offer 
arbitration (FOA) replaces the right to strike. 
FOA involves an arbitrator being present with the union 's final claim and the 
employer's final offer. The arbitrator must choose one or other of the two positions 
62 Hon Ruth Dyson (15 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6499. 
63 Police Act 1958, s 80. 
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presented, in its entirety and cannot select certain aspects of each offer. 
64 FOA attempts 
to eliminate strikes and to encourage settlement reached by collective-bargaining. 
Under a restrictive model, theoretically the parties are forced to be reasonable with 
regard to every aspect of their claims and offers because the result is all or nothing. The 
value judgment behind it is that the settlements reached by collective bargaining are 
healthier for the industrial relations system than arbitrated decisions. 
65 
The FOA system is not without flaws. As the British Advisory Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service commented, FOA "may not necessarily stand the test of fairness or 
improve relations in the long term."
66 Damage caused by an unworkable or 
unacceptable imposition of a final offer far outweighs the theoretical benefit of 
encouraging the parties to settle on their own account. FOA does not allow for a 
compromise to be reached. The more the parties differ in their assessment of the 
arbitrator's likely decision, the wider apart the final offers will be. Therefore, where 
negotiation fails, the arbitrator's award will be more extreme. If the system produces 
awards which are considered unjust, extreme or unworkable, parties may lose faith and 
behave in a manner that undermines the system. Moreover, the outcome of FOA will 
depend on the arbitrator's perception of what is reasonable, which tends to heavily 
favour employers and is likely to be met with union and employee hostility. 
Other forms of FOA are more flexible and may overcome the inadequate and 
unsatisfactory results produced by more restrictive FOA. In some jurisdictions a 
tripartite panel makes decisions instead of a single arbitrator. Another form of FOA is 
"issue-by-issue" FOA where the arbitrator is able to select a number of items from the 
union's final claim and the rest from the employer's final offer. While this introduces 
an element of compromise, arbitrators are likely to be swayed by DHB arguments that 
the union's demands are too costly in light of inadequate government funding. By 
imposing FOA, the right to strike is completely removed. Given that it is a model that 
has already been employed in New Zealand, the focus on FOA is not unreasonable. 
However, it is arguable that while workable, such drastic legislation should be reserved 
64 Karen Roper "An Offer They Can't Refuse: The Imposition of Final Offer Arbitration in the New 
Zealand State Sector" ( I 988) 13 NZJIR 79, 76. 
65 Ibid , 83. 
66 Ibid. 
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for situations where industrial action would result m lawlessness and create a 
guaranteed national emergency. 
C Solutions within the Current Act? 
Another possible solution can be found within the ERA itself In 2004 the Act 
was amended and section 50A was added with the purpose of facilitating collective 
bargaining. Section 50A provides a process enabling parties to seek assistance of the 
Employment Relations Authority in resolving serious difficulties in concluding a 
collective agreement. Section SOB enables one or more matters relating to barging for a 
collective agreement to be referred to the Authority for facilitation. While facilitation is 
not defmed in the ERA, it is clearly intended to be distinguished from mediation. 67 The 
Authority may make non-binding recommendations about the process or substantive 
outcome of bargaining for a collective agreement and has discretion to give public 
notice of such a recommendation. 68 The publication of a recommendation is likely to 
have a considerable impact on public opinion, whether for or against the union's cause. 
These legislative provisions may provide an appropriate and balanced solution 
to some of the issues raised in this paper. A facilitation process eliminates the 
arbitrariness associated with FOA. While the recommendations made are not binding, 
as a neutral-third party, the Authority may act as a "circuit breaker" and draw the 
parties' attention back to the central issues of the dispute. 69 However, facilitation is not 
compulsory under the ERA and it is up to a party to the dispute to make a reference to 
the Authority. If facilitation was made a compulsory step in the collective bargaining 
process when bargaining reaches an impasse, it would potentially provide further 
protection against the possibility of strikes in the health sector. If section 50C( I)( c) and 
(d), the grounds on which the Authority may accept reference, are modified to require 
that reference must be made when a strike appears imminent, futiher protection may be 
provided against the negative effects of strikes. 
While compulsory facilitation may provide extra protection against the 
possibility of strikes, such provisions do not completely eliminate the possibility of 
67 Gordon Anderson Employment Law Guide (7 ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) 326. 
68 Ibid, 333. 
69 Ibid , 334. 
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industrial action. However, this added bargaining process may achieve a workable 
balance by providing appropriate Authority input that is aimed at avoiding industrial 
action. 
V INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
Guidance on viable legislative changes may be taken from consideration of other 
jurisdictions' legislative schemes. Strikes in the health sector are not unique to New 
Zealand. In the past 20 years there have been strikes by medical professionals and other 
health sector workers in over 20 countries. 
70 Some countries have chosen to severely 
limit the right to strike generally while others have focused on direct legislation 
pertaining to the heath sector. The question remains, what legislative scheme and who 
internationally has struck the right balance between the rights of workers and the rights 
and interests of patients and the public at large? Australian federal legislation provides a 
useful comparison when considering whether the ERA provides a fair and correct 
balance. 
A Australian Work Choices: Suppression of Strikes Australia-wide 
The "right to strike" in Australia is a legislated right first granted by the Federal 
Parliament in 1993 and replicated under the Workplace Relations Act l 996. It was 
considered at the time that unless there was legal immunity given to employees to 
withhold their labour when negotiating workplace agreements, the bargaining system 
could not operate effectively. 
71 However, although the Government claimed that ''we 
won't remove the right to strike" under the Work Relations (Work Choices) 
Amendment Act 2005 the legal right to strike is practically fictitious. 
72 Work Choices 
is a prescriptive, command and control penal model designed to legally curtail 
''unlawful" industrial action. 73 
l The legislative scheme 
Work Choices gave significant new rights to halt "protected action" to any third 
party affected by industrial action; that is, not the employer and employees in dispute. 
70 These include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, China, India, Ireland, 
Israel , Italy, Korea , Malta , Peru, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Romania , USA, UK, Zambia and Zimbabwe: 
Frizzelle, above n 2. 
71 "The Right to Strike" (July 2002) No 89 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Review 1 
72 Ibid, 66. 
73 Ibid, 68. 
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Under section 111 of the Act, the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) 
must stop all strikes that are not "protected action". 74 As in New Zealand, industrial 
action is still legal during a recognised bargaining period for a new collective 
agreement. However, the bargaining period can be suspended or terminated by 
government decree, by the AIRC or through legal action by an affected third party. 
Executive power is given to the minister to declare a bargaining period terminated, 
resulting in industrial action being halted. 75 The minister may form an opinion on 
what is likely to cause "significant damage to an important part of the Australian 
economy" which is not limited to the essential services of the army, policy and senior 
public servants but can extend to cover the health sector. To restrain or prevent strike 
action the minister must be sure that industrial action is being taken, is threatened, 
impending or is probable; 76 and if satisfied of that, the minister must present a written 
declaration that the strike is hurting a business or its employees, 77 threatens the life or 
health of the population78 or could damage the Australian economy. 79 
When there is significant harm to any third person, or action adversely affects 
the employer, AIRC must suspend the bargaining period.80 Therefore, industrial action 
is at risk where third parties are considered "particularly vulnerable" or industrial action 
"threatens to damage the viability of business", "disrupts the supply of goods or 
services to a business", "reduces the person's capacity to fulfil a contractual obligation" 
or "causes other economic loss". 81 In relation to strikes within the health sector that 
constitute protected action, it is difficult to imagine that such action will not result in 
some economic damage to third parties as patients and any person affected by public 
sector bargaining, can apply to have the bargaining period suspended. 
74 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) , s 108. Action by a person is 
protected action if: (a) the action is protected action under subsection (2) or (3); and (b) no provision of 
Subdivision B excludes the action from being protected action; and (c) subsection 107K(3) does not 
exclude the action from being protected action . 
75 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choice ) Act 2005 (Cth) , s 112. 
76 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), s 112( I )(a) 
77 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), s l 12(l)(b) 
78 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) , s l 12(l)(c)(i) 
79 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), s l 12(1)(c)(ii) 
80 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), s 1071 
81 Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) , s 107J (2)(a-d) 
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2 Work Choices: the.flaws 
With high penalties to curtail prospective strike action, Work Choices moved 
away from "repressive tolerance" towards the legal suppression of strikes in Australia. 
82 
While this legislation is not health sector-specific, it shows a significant shift to greater 
corporate power and state intervention against unionised industrial action. It appears to 
do little more than implement an ideological agenda in which workers and their trade 
unions are the primary victims. 8
3 No balance is struck between the right to strike and 
the safety of patients. While Work Choices may prevent any inconvenience, delay in 
treatment and other associated problems with strikes, it takes away the legitimate right 
of workers to withdraw their labour. As Victorian Industrial Relations Minister Rob 
Hull said, Work Choices "kicks workers in the guts twice. "
84 If similar legislation was 
enacted in New Zealand, the ability to negotiate better pay and conditions, which is 
invariably associated with the ability to engage in industrial action, would be prevented. 
The outcry of the public would simply be replaced with the protests of unions and 
employees prevented from striking. Such a legislative scheme would unfairly favour 
DHBs. A legislative model that creates an almost fictitious right to strike and that tips 
the balance so strongly in favour of employers would not be acceptable in New Zealand. 
B Comparative International Position of Health Sector Workers: Does the ERA 
Strike the Right Balance? 
Unionisation is not straightforward for health sector workers as there is a clear 
fiduciary relationship with their patients. The fiduciary relationship does not sit well 
with unionisation as the full potential of a unionised workforce is often manifested in 
strike action. 85 In America, some bargaining groups such as Physicians for Responsible 
Negotiation - the labour arm of the American Medical Association - voluntarily reject 
strike action. 86 The absence of the threat or possible employment of industrial action 
significantly reduces the bargaining power of the negotiation body. In light of the fact 
that health sector workers are currently permitted to strike coupled with their 
82 White, above n 25, 77. 
83 Craig Thomson, National Secretary Health Service Union "Submission to Senate Employment, 
Workplace Relation and Education Legislation Committee, Inquiry into the Workplaces Relations 
Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005". 
84 Ian Haberfield and Lincoln Wright "New Laws to bust Strikes: Minister Gets Broad Powers" (18 
December 2005) Sunday Herald Sun Melbourne. 
85 Roderick Mulgan Why Has Labour Law Failed Resident Doctors? (LLB(Hons) Research Paper, 
Victoria University, 2006) 9 
86 Ibid, 9. 
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willingness to take industrial action, it is tempting to conclude that success in New 
Zealand, be it limited success, is a result of a more liberal legislative approach 
guaranteeing the fundamental right to strike, compared to that taken in Australia. 
Internationally, New Zealand cannot compete economically in terms of wages, therefore 
it is important that health sector workers are able to engage in industrial action in order 
to secure the best possible conditions and prevent the emigration of health professionals. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The right to strike should not be removed without serious, careful consideration 
and balancing of the interests of the effected parties, the employer and the employees. 
Although not contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the right to strike 
is an internationally recognised human right. If legislation deprives a workforce of the 
right, those workers must be afforded appropriate guarantees to compensate for this 
restriction. 87 A prohibition in such circumstances should at least be accompanied by 
adequate, impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration proceedings in which both 
the employer and employees or their union take part. While compulsory arbitration is 
generally regarded as unacceptable by the ILO, it may be regarded as acceptable as an 
alternative to strikes in essential services where interruption to those services would 
endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. 88 
Thus, by international standards, the removal of the right to strike in the health sector 
would be acceptable. 
While the health sector would certainly fall within the ILO' s "essential service" 
definition, legislation in New Zealand has dealt with "endangerment of life, personal 
safety or health" by imposing restrictions on the right to strike, rather than removing it 
altogether. The Code's requirement of provision of LPS adequately deals with safety 
issues that may arise during industrial action. Effective contingency planning on behalf 
of the employer ensures that if a patient requires LPS he/she will receive it. The ERA 
provides a real right to strike compared to Australian legislation where severe legislative 
limitations mean the right is practically fictitious. Such a legislative scheme is 
unacceptable. The fact that New Zealand cannot compete economically with other 
87 International Labour Organization Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the 
Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the !LO (4 ed , International Labour 
Organization , Geneva, 1996) para 546. 
88 Ibid , para 515. 
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jurisdictions means that it is important that health sector workers are able to engage in 
industrial action in order to secure the best working conditions possible. If not New 
Zealand's medical brain-drain will continue. If the right to strike can be preserved 
without endangerment of life or health, legislation must preserve this right. 
The motivation behind industrial action is that it causes disruption and delay to 
the employers' business in order to force the parties back to the table. It is the delay in 
treatment that has sparked the majority of public and political anger and debate. 
However, hospitals are already understaffed and in many cases, long waits are 
customary for operations, treatment programmes and emergency department services. 
While strike action adds to this delay, it is also industrial action that seeks to change 
working conditions and increase staffing levels which will in tum provide better care 
and treatment for patients. 
To remove the right to strike is to eliminate all union bargaining power and 
unfairly advantage DHBs. In light of the legislative limitations and safety provisions, 
the removal of this right is not really necessary. However, several viable legislative 
changes may enable enhanced protection for patients and against the possibility of 
industrial action in future disputes. One solution may focus on limiting the period of 
time for which strikes in the health sector may extend. This may prevent some of the 
treatment delay caused by industrial action. Another possibility is an extension of the 
Code's patient safety provisions to include the provision of long-term, ongoing 
treatment. This would enable cancer patients, who appear greatly affected by health 
sector strikes, the necessary treatment to ensure the best possible outcomes. 
Compulsory facilitation may also provide greater protection against strikes, without 
removing the right altogether. If legislative change is considered necessary by the 
Government, it is important that the right to strike is not removed simply because of 
public pressure. From a principled employment law perspective, a complete removal of 
the right to strike would create an uneven balance between the interests of the public, 
employees and health sector workers. 
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